Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

7-1-2014

An Originalist Argument for a Sixth Amendment Right to
Competent Counsel
Erica J. Hashimoto
University of Georgia, hashimo@uga.edu

Repository Citation
Erica J. Hashimoto, An Originalist Argument for a Sixth Amendment Right to Competent Counsel , 99
Iowa L. Rev 1999 (2014),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1018

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

An Originalist Argument for a Sixth
Amendment Right to Competent Counsel
EricaJ.Hashimoto
ABSTRACT: The Treason Act of 1696 provided a right to counsel in
treason cases in England and laid the framework for the right to counsel
both in England and in the United States. Evidence suggests that the
Treason Act may have influenced the Framersof the Constitution;thus, any
historical understanding of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should
consider the quality of representation treason defendants received. If as
appears to be the case, treason defendants had competent, experienced
lawyers representing them, then the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may
well include the right to such representation. This Essay suggests that the
Court's current ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine does not adequately

reflect this historical understanding of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.
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INTRODUCTION

More than twenty years ago, Professor Bruce Green argued that an
original understanding of the word "counsel" for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment (at least in capital cases) should include only those lawyers
qualified to serve as defense counsel.' Since that time, the Court not only has
accepted original arguments regarding the meaning of certain Sixth
Amendment phrases, but also has significantly reformulated Sixth
Amendment doctrine as a result.- The Court's recent willingness to
entertain arguments regarding the original meaning of the Sixth
Amendment's text provides a timely opportunity to revisit Professor Green's
definition of counsel and to explore the effect that definition would have on
the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v.
Washington.3
In the past decade, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the
importance of original meaning in determining (or redefining) the
parameters of the Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses and to be
tried before a jury.4 This shift to originalist analysis has required that the
Court completely change the doctrine in each of these Sixth Amendment
areas.5 Symmetry of logic suggests that the Court may bring a similar

1.

See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78

IOWA L. REV. 433 (1993).
2.

See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004) (holding that the Sixth

Amendment requires that facts that raise the maximum sentence under the guidelines must be
proven to the jury); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (drawing on the history of
the Confrontation Clause to hold that the word "witnesses" for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause encompasses those who "bear testimony" against
defendants); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of
JusticeScalia, the Unlikely Friend of CriminalDefendants , 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005).
3.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359-6 1 (2oo8) (setting forth the practice at
the time the Bill of Rights was ratified in limiting the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the
Confrontation Clause to instances when the defendant intended to cause the witness to be
unavailable); Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (defining the "elements" of an offense that must be proven
to ajury by reference to historical practices); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (defining the meaning of
the word "witnesses" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause with
reference to the historical meaning of the word); Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478-80
(2000) (reviewing history in England and during the founding years here to reject the state's
distinction between elements of the offense and sentencing factors).
5.
Crawford is perhaps the best example of that, rejecting the balancing framework set
forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (198o), and holding that testimonial statements are
categorically barred by the Confrontation Clause. To be sure, the Court's historical account of
the Confrontation Clause has been the subject of excoriating academic criticism. See Randolph
N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV.
219 (2005). But Crawfords doctrine nonetheless has survived.
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originalist perspective to the Sixth Amendment's "assistance of counsel"
guaranty.6
As it turns out, however, the existing historical account of the English
right to counsel is incomplete. This Essay offers a new account, arguing that
any assessment of the original meaning of the right to counsel must focus on
the Treason Act of 1696. Consideration of that Act suggests that the Sixth
Amendment right to the "assistance of counsel" may well be more robust
than the Court has previously recognized. In particular, although the Court
perhaps should maintain a Strickland-like framework for Due Process claims,
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should encompass the right to be
represented by experienced defense counsel.7

I.

THE ENGLISH HISTORY OF COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES

Where should one look to unearth the original meaning of our
Constitution's safeguard of the right to counsel? The colonial practice has
received some scholarly attention,8 as have some aspects of English law in
the period leading up to the ratification of the Sixth Amendment.9 But
English practice under the Treason Act of 1696 has received almost no
consideration by scholars addressing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
This omission is significant because that Act was the one and only statute
that guaranteed a right to counsel in England prior to the adoption of the
Bill of Rights. ° To be sure, scholars have composed detailed histories of
Parliament's passage of the Treason Act of 1696 and the impact that Act had
on English criminal procedure in non-treason felony cases. None of this

There are certain cases that are so "watershed" and have become so ingrained in
6.
American culture that the Court likely could not abandon them. Described as a "watershed"
constitutional rule, Gideon is perhaps the most widely acknowledged example of untouchable
precedent. See, e.g.,John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Gideon Exceptionalism?, 122 YALE L.J.
2126, 2131 (2013) (noting that "Gideon is the only decision ever cited by the Supreme Court as
an example of the kind of watershed rule of criminal procedure that so implicates fundamental
fairness as to require retroactive application in habeas corpus"). But other than Gideon, very
little of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel doctrine likely falls in that category.
Professor George Thomas also has argued that Stricklands framework is inconsistent
7.
with the historical meaning of counsel in England. See George C. Thomas III, History's Lesson for
the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 543, 570 (arguing that "counsel" in the colonial period
encompassed the role of the attorney as specialized advisor, rather than the attorney as alter
ego to the defendant).
See, e.g., WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 14-22
8.
(1955); JAMESJ. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: A REFERENCE GUIDE
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 9-13 (2002); George C. Thomas III, Colonial Criminal
Law and Procedure:The Royal Colony of New Jersey 1749-57, 1 N.Y.U.J. L. & LIBERTY 671 (2005).

9.
See, e.g., TOMKOVICZ, supra note 8, at 2-6; J.M. Beattie, Scales ofJustice: Defense Counsel
and the English Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 221
(1991); Alexander H. Shapiro, Political Theory and the Growth of Defensive Safeguards in Criminal
Procedure: The Origins of the Treason trialsAct of 1696, 11 LAw & HIST. REv. 215 (1993).
1o.
See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,
309-10 (1978); see also Shapiro, supra note 9.
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scholarship, however, has focused on how the Treason Act may have
informed the thinking of late eighteenth-century Americans about the
meaning of the right to counsel. This Part will summarize the history of the
Treason Act of 1696 and the impact the Act had on criminal procedure in
non-treason felony cases in England.
A.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE TREASONACT OF 1696

Prior to the eighteenth century, English law prohibited counsel from
appearing in any felony criminal cases (unless the court, in its discretion,
permitted counsel to appear), and until the middle of the eighteenth
century, judges regularly denied felony defendants the opportunity to be
represented by counsel." In other words, felony defendants had to
represent themselves.12 The first exception to this prohibition on counsel in
felony cases came when Parliament passed the Treason Act of 1696.'3
Understanding the significance of the Act requires an understanding of
the historical context in which it was adopted. In seventeenth century
England, both prominent political parties of the day-the Whigs and
Tories-used treason prosecutions as a political tool against each other.14
Before the Revolution of 1688-the so-called "Glorious Revolution"-which
resulted in the overthrow of King James II, the Stuart regime used treason
laws to arrest, try, and execute many members of the radical Whig
opposition movement, including Lord William Russell and Algernon
Sydney.'5 Indeed, many of the practices in treason cases in the late
seventeenth century were carried over from the notorious Star Chamber,
which subjected treason defendants to a "disregard of basic individual
rights."' 6 The Star Chamber was abolished in 1641, but the Crown

11. A statutory right to counsel was granted in 1836, but counsel began to appear with
more regularity in felony cases throughout the eighteenth century. See BEANEY, supra note 8, at
8-12; Beattie, supra note 9, at 22 1-22.
12.
For reasons that are not altogether clear, counsel was permitted to appear for
defendants in misdemeanor cases. See BEANEY, supra note 8,at 8.
13.
An Act for Regulateing of Tryals in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason, 1696,
7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3 (Eng.), in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 6 (John Raithby ed., 1820); see
TOMKOVICZ, supra note 8, at 6-7; Shapiro, supra note 9, at 217-18.
14.
See Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science:
From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY LJ. 437, 476-77 (1996) (noting the spectrum of political
figures who had been subject to prosecution for treason); Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the
"American CriminalClass": Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L.
REV. 599, 632-33 ("After the Restoration of the Crown in 166o... the Whigs charged many of
those closest to King Charles II with a papist conspiracy ....But the wheel of fortune turned
and the opposition Whigs soon found themselves on the receiving end of treason
accusations."); Shapiro, supranote 9, at 219-20.
15. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 219-20.
16. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6, 821-22 (1975) (describing the Star Chamber as
having "symbolized disregard of basic individual rights" and noting that impact on the drafting
and ratification of the Sixth Amendment); see also Colin Miller, Impeachable Offenses?: Why Civil
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continued to bring treason prosecutions against those who made statements
against the King, and it offered virtually no protections to defendants in
those cases. Of particular importance, defense counsel were permitted only
at the discretion of the court even though the Crown generally was
represented by a lawyer.,7 Because both Tories and Whigs endured the
injustices of treason prosecutions, both parties sensed the need for reform.
In 1688, the Whigs joined forces with some Tories to overthrow King
James II and to install William of Orange and his wife Mary (the daughter of
James II) as the King and Queen.'8 As a result, Parliament gained
significantly more power than it had had under King James II.,9 With that
power, Parliament quickly tried to limit the extent to which political
opponents could use treason charges to persecute each other.
Reformers identified many problems with the prosecution of treason
cases, including: (1) the expansive definition of treason to include "treason
by words" (essentially libel); (2) blatant perjury by witnesses; and (3) the
°
lack of impartiality on the part of judges, who strongly favored the Crown.2
Also problematic was the inability of treason defendants to make use of
counsel. The lack of counsel in treason cases was particularly problematic
for two reasons. First, the crime of treason had become very legally complex
(far above the comprehension of lay defendants). Second, the Crown was
represented by counsel in treason cases, unlike in most other felony
prosecutions.1 In the period following the Glorious Revolution, reformers
tried to gain greater protection for treason defendants.2 Those early reform
efforts failed, however, at least in part because some Whigs believed that the
Revolution would remove the conditions that had produced past abuses.23
Several treason trials in the 169os showed that those hopes were
misplaced.24 The result was the Treason Act of 1696, which provided broad
access to counsel in treason cases.2 The Act initially specified that every
5

Parties in Quasi-criminal Cases Should Be Treated Like Criminal Defendants Under the Felony
Impeachment Rule, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 997, 1004 (2009).
17.
SeeLangbein, supranote 1o, at 309-11.
18.

See William Ewald, James Wilson and the Scottish Enlightenment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1053,

1078-79 (2010) (documenting the Glorious Revolution and its religious underpinnings). The
roots of the Glorious Revolution related to religious conflict, most prominently the fact that King
James II was Catholic and proposed offering rights to Catholics, giving rise to fears among
Protestants that they soon would be persecuted. Id.
See Michael Tonry, Determinants of PenalPolicies, 36 CRIME &JUST. 1, 25 (2007) (noting
19.
that the aim of the Revolution was to "confirm the power of the political classes by limiting the
power of the monarch").
21.

See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 222-24.
Langbein, supra note 1o, at 309-11; Shapiro, supranote 9, at 222-24.

22.

See Shapiro, supranote 9, at 244.

23.

Id. at 2 4 5- 4 6.

24.
25.

Id. at 246-49.
Id. at 246.

20.
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IOWA LAWREVLEW

[Vol.- 99:

1999

person charged with treason "shall bee received and admitted to make his
and their full Defence by Counsel learned in the Law."26 The reference to
"full defence" made clear that counsel could participate in all aspects of
representation, arguing both facts and law for the defendant.27 This textual
protection marked a significant step because Parliament did not protect
assistance of counsel on both factual and legal grounds in non-treason
felony cases until well into the nineteenth century.
More remarkable for its time, the Act went on to state that if any treason
defendant "shall desire Counsel the Court before whom such
Person... shall bee tryed... shall and is hereby authorized and required
imediately upon his.., request to assigne to such Person... such and soe
many Counsel not exceeding Two as the Person or Persons shall desire."28
Although there is not extensive documentation of treason prosecutions in
the eighteenth century, anecdotal evidence suggests that treason defendants
had counsel in reported cases.2 9 Indeed, there is at least one example of a
judge appointing two lawyers to an indigent treason defendant-James
Hadfield-upon the defendant's request that those specific attorneys
represent him.3o
Although the Treason Act clearly guaranteed defendants an
unprecedented right to counsel, the precise meaning of "counsel" in the
Treason Act is less clear. Dictionaries of the time defined "counsel" as "an
Advocate or Counsellour, one who pleads for his Client at the Bar of a Court
of Justice,"3' and "bar" was defined as "the Place where Lawyers Stand to
Plead Causes in Courts of Judicature."2 At the very least, then, the phrase
"assistance of counsel" encompassed the right to be represented by a lawyer
admitted to the Bar.

26. An Act for Regulateing of Tryals in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason, 1696,
7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1 (Eng.), in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 6 (John Raithby ed., 1820).
27.
Langbein, Criminal Trial, supra note 1o, at 312 (noting that during the 1730s counsel
could cross-examine witnesses and offer observations about the evidence to the jury).
28.
Treason Act, 1696, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § I (Eng.). Professor Langbein has explained
that this provision required not that counsel be appointed to indigent defendants in treason
cases, but rather served only "to legitimate the service of defense lawyers as a professional
activity that might otherwise be treated as conspiracy in the alleged treason." JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 94 (2003).
29.
John H. Langbein, The ProsecutorialOrigins of Defence Counsel in the Eighteenth Century:
The Appearance of Solicitors, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 314, 341 nn.145-47 (1999) (documenting
instances of representation in treason cases in the eighteenth century); Richard Moran, The
Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trialfor Treason ofJames Hadfield (18oo), 19 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 487, 498-5o8 (1985) (describing the representation of Hadfield by the Hon. Thomas
Erskine).
30.
See Moran, supra note 29, at 498 (noting that Hadfield, "[a]cknowledging his
poverty," requested that the court appoint the Hon. Thomas Erskine and Mr. Serjeant Best as
his counsel, and they did in fact represent him).
31.
See N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGIcAL ENGLISH DICrIONARY 217 (1721).
32.
Id. at 93.
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What kind of proficiency was expected of these lawyers? Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the attorneys representing treason defendants after
the passage of the Treason Act of 1696 had broad experience in the law,
and in particular often had significant experience representing treason
defendants. For instance, Lord Thomas Erskine, one of the most successful
barristers of his day who would later become the Lord Chancellor in the
Ministry of All Talents, represented many treason defendants, including
William Davis Shipley on seditious libel charges, Lord George Gordon for
his role in the riots of 178o, Thomas Paine and other radical society
members, and James Hadfield.33 Of particular note, Erskine represented
James Hadfield after Hadfield, who was indigent, requested that Erskine
represent him and the presiding judge so ordered.34 Similarly, John
Hungerford, a Tory politician, represented four defendants charged with
treason, including George Purchase on appeal of a treason conviction;
Francis Francia in 1717; John Matthews, charged in 1719 with treason for

printing a libel against the King; and Christopher Layer in 1722.35 In short,
many of the lawyers representing treason defendants after passage of the Act
stood at the highest levels of the Bar and gained significant experience in
those cases.36 It appears, then, that by guaranteeing the right to "Counsel
learned in the Law,"37 the Treason Act in practice provided defense by an
experienced practitioner knowledgeable in the area of law in which he was
to represent the defendant.
B.

EFFECTOF THE TREASON ACT

Beyond its direct impact on treason cases, the right to counsel guaranty
of the Treason Act influenced the development of right to counsel both in
non-treason felony cases in England and, of most importance, in the Sixth
Amendment. To be sure, the Treason Act protected only a relatively small
subset of felony defendants.3 8 And many (although certainly not all) treason
33.
34.

Moran, supranote 29, at 498.
Id.

35.
See THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 192-94 (Malcolm
Coulthard & Alison Johnson eds., 2010); Langbein, supra note 29, at 341 & n.147. Sir

Bartholomew Shower, another prominent Tory activist, also represented a number of Tories
charged with treason. See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, log COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1889
n.214 (2009) (noting that Bartholomew was a "noted Tory lawyer"). As discussed above, the
Tories were as much victims of treason prosecutions as the Whigs.
36.
Of course, because prior to the passage of the Treason Act, counsel could appear in
treason cases only with the permission of the court, it is unlikely that many lawyers were
experienced in treason cases at the time the Act passed.
37.
An Act for Regulateing of Tryals in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason, 1696,
7 & 8 Will. 3, c.3, § 1 (Eng.), in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 6 (John Raithby ed., 1820).
38.
See George Fisher, TheJury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 618 (1997) (noting
that although there was a "proliferation of treason trials" in the last decade of the Stuarts'
reigns, "[aiccused traitors had not been the only criminal defendants to lose their lives for want
of counsel").
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defendants were political elites, so it is entirely possible that post-Act treason
defendants attracted high quality lawyers precisely because they were wealthy
and charged with political crimes.39 Lessons from the Treason Act therefore
may not necessarily apply across the spectrum of all felony cases.
That fact notwithstanding, the Treason Act appears to have set the
course for a broader right to counsel both in England and in the colonies.
Although Parliament did not provide felony defendants with a right to
counsel until 1836, by the 173os, many courts in England exercised their
discretion to allow counsel to appear for felony defendants.4o The Treason
Act's right to counsel guarantee appears to have prompted the trend
towards permitting representation by counsel in felony cases.4' In general,
counsel in felony cases played a more limited role than in treason cases. In
particular, although counsel could address questions of law and crossexamine witnesses, they could neither discuss facts nor address the jury in
argument or present a defense.4 Because the role of counsel in England
appears to have been much more limited than in at least some of the
colonies, some scholars have argued that the framers of the Constitution did
not look to England in protecting the rights of the defendant under the
Sixth Amendment.4s But this position ignores the Treason Act and the
broad conception of the right to counsel to which it gave rise.
There is, moreover, at least some evidence suggesting that the Treason
Act influenced the colonists and, later, the drafters of the Bill of Rights.
First, there is reason to believe that Americans during and after the
Revolution would have known of, and reacted to, the experience of
defendants in treason trials in particular. For instance, Thomas Paine-the
leading popular theorist of the American Revolutionary movement-had
been prosecuted for treason in England.44 No less important, in debating a

39.
Id. (noting that the Treason Act "expose[d] men of high rank and conspicuous
position to the calamities which must have been felt by thousands of obscure criminals without
attracting even a passing notice") (quoting 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW Or ENGLAND 402 (1883) ).
40.
Beattie, supra note 9, at 223-24; Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation
Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERs LJ. 77, 83-84 (1995); Langbein, supra note lo, at
307.
41.
In addition, as Professor Langbein has documented, this trend toward permitting
counsel in felony cases also corresponded to an increase in prosecutions undertaken by the
Crown. See Langbein, supra note lo, at 313 (describing both the relaxation of the rule
prohibiting defense counsel and the increase in the number of prosecutions).
42.
Beattie, supra note 9, at 221; Erica J. Hashimoto, ResurrectingAutonomy: The Criminal
Defendant's Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1165 (2010).
43.
SeeJonakait, supra note 40, at 94 (arguing that "[iun drafting the Amendment, the
Framers were not incorporating English law. Instead, they were constitutionalizing an existing
American practice that had emerged before the Bill of Rights").
44. Paine was tried in absentia after he fled to France. Sir Thomas Erskine represented
Paine at the trial, and although he mounted a vigorous defense, the jury convicted Paine. See
Moran, supra note 29, at 498.

2014]

AN ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT FOR COMPETENT COUNSEL

2007

number of provisions of the Constitution, the Framers specifically focused
on the use of treason prosecutions to quell dissenting speech.45
Second, both colonial history and post-Revolutionary experience
demonstrate the influence of the Treason Act. As scholars have noted, many
colonies and later states guaranteed the right to counsel in their state
charters or by statute prior to the date on which Parliament guaranteed the
right to counsel in non-treason felony cases.46 The path of the colonies, and
ultimately the Constitution, therefore appears to have hewed more closely to
the Treason Act than the right in English courts as a general matter.47
Third, the Treason Act laid the foundation for other Sixth Amendment
rights.48 In addition to the counsel guarantee, the Treason Act required:

(1) that any prosecution be commenced with an indictment; and (2) that
defendants have a right to "compell their Witnesses to appeare for them att
any such Tryal or Tryale as is usually granted to compell Witnesses to
appeare against them."49 The Bill of Rights provided these very same
protections in the Fifth5o and Sixths, Amendments, respectively. And
although, unlike with the right to counsel, Parliament acted relatively
quickly after the Treason Act to extend at least the right to compulsory
process to all felony cases,52 the Treason Act provided the first English basis
for both of these criminal process guarantees.
Nor are the parameters of the right to counsel that arise from
incorporating practice under the Treason Act anomalous. As Professor
Green sets forth in his history of counsel in this country prior to 1791, the
"critical distinguishing feature" of counsel in 1791 "was not the receipt of
authorization to appear before the court" or the obtaining of a license to do

45.
Article III provides that "[n]o Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. This mirrors the
language in the Treason Act's requirement that prosecutions be upon "the Oaths and
Testimony of two lawfull Witnesses," An Act for Regulateing of Tryals in Cases of Treason and
Misprision of Treason, 1696, 7 & 8, Will. 3, c. 3, § II (Eng.), in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 6
(John Raithby ed., 1820).
46.
BEANEY, supra note 8, at 14-22 (tracing the colonial history of the right to counsel
and concluding that in the post-Revolutionary period, most states provided a right to counsel);
Jonakait, supra note 40, at 95.
47.
SeeJonakait, supra note 40, at log ("The Sixth Amendment, in granting a full right to
counsel in all cases, was not constitutionalizing English law. It was rejecting, or at least going
beyond, the existing common law.").
48.
See generally Fisher, supra note 38.
49. Treason Act, 1696, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1 (Eng.).
50.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury....").
51.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.... .").
52.
See Fisher, supra note 38, at 616 (noting that six years after the Treason Act,
Parliament extended the requirement of sworn defense witnesses to all felony cases).
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Instead, "the distinguishing characteristic of licensed practitioners in
1791 was that they were qualified, by virtue of their legal knowledge and
good character, to practice competently before the courts."54 The Treason
Act history described above therefore buttresses this argument that the right
to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment encompassed the right to a
competent legal representative.
Two potential counterarguments to this interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment merit a response. First, although the Treason Act may have led
to the appointment of well-qualified lawyers, the language of the Treason
Act contains a critical phrase missing from the Sixth Amendment. Recall
that the Treason Act required the court, upon request by the defendant, to
assign "such and soe many Counsel not exceeding two as the Person or
Persons shall desire."55 This phrase appears to have required court to accede
to the defendant's choice of counsel. Because that critical phrase does not
appear in the Sixth Amendment, one could argue that practice under the
Treason Act has no relevance to the Sixth Amendment.
Such an argument, however, misses the key point that the Act created
an understanding about the law's commitment to representation by skilled
attorneys. Allowing treason defendants to select their lawyers was one way to
ensure skillful representation. But the point of continuing salience is that
the law embodied a commitment to this end-and that the law in fact
operated to provide qualified lawyers.
Second, some might argue that the Treason Act representsjust one very
specialized statute with limited application that ultimately tells us nothing
about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. But as discussed above, the Act
was a known and often-used statute.56 Perhaps of most importance, it
constitutes the only statute that required counsel in pre-Constitution
England.
The historical record of the passage of the Treason Act, its operation in
England, and its influence on the fledgling colonies and later the states
provide persuasive evidence that the right to counsel the Framers conceived
incorporated a conception of "counsel" that included experience in matters
as to which the lawyer's work pertained. Particularly in conjunction with the
arguments marshaled by Professor Green regarding what "counsel" meant in
the states in 1791, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the "right to counsel"
encompasses not just access to a licensed lawyer but also representation by
knowledgeable counsel.
so.53

53.
54.
55.

Green, supra note i,at 468.
Id. at 468-69.
An Act for Regulateing of Tryals in Cases of Treason and Misprison of Treason, 1696,
7 & 8 Will. 3,c. 3,§ I (Eng.), in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 6 (John Raithby ed., 1820)
(emphasis added).
56. See supra Part L.B.
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THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING AND
CURRENT DOCTRINE

That leads to the question whether the Court's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel doctrine is consistent with the right guaranteed by the Treason
Act. I think the answer to that question is no, primarily because the right to
counsel provided by current Sixth Amendment law guarantees only a right
to an attorney who does not make egregious errors rather than
representation by knowledgeable counsel.57 The Sixth Amendment provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."58 In right to counsel cases, the
Court's focus has been limited to whether (1) a lawyer was provided; and
(2) a lawyer assured that the defendant received a minimally fair trial. But
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel operates independently of whether
the defendant received a fair trial. Instead, the fair trial protection is a
bedrock protection provided not by the Sixth Amendment but by the Fifth
Amendment (and Fourteenth Amendment) Due Process Clause. This Part
sets forth the current framework for right to counsel claims and identifies
the ways in which this framework is inconsistent with the original meaning of
the right to counsel.
Twenty years after Gideon, the Court issued its key decision governing
the quality of counsel guaranteed by the Constitution. In Strickland v.
Washington, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right to the
"assistance of counsel" requires not only that a lawyer appear for the
defendant, but also that the lawyer provide "effective" assistance of
counsel.59 The Court explained that if counsel's performance "so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result," the defendant is
entitled to reversal. 6° The Court then went on to articulate a standard for
proving ineffectiveness that has proven to be virtually impossible to meet: a
defendant must establish both that counsel performed deficiently and that
counsel's errors affected the outcome of the proceedings, the so-called
"prejudice" inquiry. 6'
57.
The Court's Sixth Amendment right to counsel doctrine has developed almost
entirely without any consideration of original meaning. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires effective assistance of counsel with
no discussion of original meaning); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that
misdemeanor defendants sentenced to fines do not have right to counsel without any mention
of original meaning); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that felony
defendants have a right to counsel without examining the original meaning of right to
counsel).
58.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

59.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
6o.
Id.
61.
See id. at 687; see also Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact
Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 ("Courts rarely reverse
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In defining the practical operation of the Sixth Amendment, Strickland
is probably no less important than Gideon. In striking contrast to Gideon,
however, Strickland has not been celebrated but instead has endured
extensive cfiticism. 62 Much of the critique stems from the fact that the
Court's focus on the accuracy of the verdict-highlighted by its emphasis on
reliability-essentially precludes relief unless the defendant can establish the
likelihood that he would have been acquitted at trial had he received proper
representation. 63 The Court, moreover, has set a nearly impossible standard
for showing deficient performance, emphasizing that even a lawyer with no
trial experience can meet the standard for effective assistance of counsel. 64
The Strickland Court's emphasis on counsel's effect on the fairness and
accuracy of the proceedings may make sense as a due process matter.65 But
because the Court decided Strickland as a matter of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, it has come to define the scope of the right to the
"assistance of counsel."

convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel .. "); Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and
the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 352-53 (2oo8) (noting that "successful ineffective
assistance claims are infrequent at best" and that "[t] he Stricklandapproach is a prescription for
disaster in capital cases"); Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standardfor Claims of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculatingthe Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 1259, 1277-79 (1986) (arguing that it is virtually impossible for defendants to prove
that a jury would have reached a different result); Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1923, 1935 (1994) (arguing that the
prejudice standard should not apply in capital trials because it is so difficult to meet).
62.
See, e.g., Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New PathsA Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 82 (1986) (arguing that the majority's reasoning is
unpersuasive); Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of CriminalDefenses Attorneys: A System
in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 18 (arguing that the Strickland standard is too
burdensome and that a defendant's right to effective counsel is virtually without substance);
William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the
Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 93, 176 (1995) (arguing that Strickland
undermines the effect of Gideon and calling for the decision to be overruled); Richard Klein,
The Constitutionalizationof Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (1999)
(arguing that Strickland interprets the requirement of the right to effective assistance of counsel
in "an ultimately meaningless manner").
63.
Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for
the Worst Lawyer, 1O3 YALE LJ. 1835, 1837-41 (1994) (discussing the life and death implications
of the low standard for effective assistance of counsel in death penalty cases); Klein, supra note
62, at 1468 (observing that the Strickland standard essentially requires a defendant to prove his
innocence); Gabriel, supra note 61, at 1277 (noting that the prejudice standard "reverses the
usual presumption that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty"); Note, The Eighth
Amendment, supra note 61, at 1931 (noting Stricklands emphasis on preventing hindsight bias
and arguing that defendants can rarely establish that they would have been acquitted).
64.
SeeUnited States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,663-66 (1984).
65.
SeeJohn C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and ProceduralDefault in
Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 684 n.25 (1990) (noting that the Strickland
standard is linked "with due process notions of fundamental fairness"); Gabriel, supra note 61,
at 1288 (arguing that the decision sacrifices explicit Sixth Amendment rights for a judiciallycreated concept of fairness).
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But the accuracy or reliability of the trial has no connection to the
historical basis for the Sixth Amendment guarantee, particularly in light of
lessons derived from the Treason Act of 1696. That Act, after all, did not
66
concern itself with assuring a minimum level of fairness in discrete cases.
Rather, it focused on ensuring the availability of well-qualified and
6
experienced counsel in across-the-board fashion. 7
An example serves to illustrate the effect of Stricklands confusion of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Until recently, the Southern District of
Georgia required every attorney who joined the bar of that court to agree to
represent criminal defendants under the Criminal Justice Act.68 For
instance, a lawyer specializing in bankruptcy who joined the Southern
District Bar in order to file bankruptcy cases could be obligated to serve as
defense counsel in criminal cases. Suffice it to say that representation by a
bankruptcy lawyer with no experience in a criminal case is not analogous to
the practice under the Treason Act, and thus-in light of the Act's
importance to the founding generation-was not the sort of practice
anticipated by the Framers of the Sixth Amendment. 69 As a result, the
appointment of such a lawyer should, on originalist grounds, be held to
violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the vast majority of
criminal cases.70
The essential difficulty is that a lawyer's inexperience in criminal cases
does not necessarily render that lawyer ineffective under the Strickland
standard.7' For instance, the Court has held that a relatively inexperienced
real estate attorney can provide effective assistance under the Strickland
standard.7" And this is so even though the risks associated with
inexperienced defense counsel have been greatly magnified by changes over
the past two centuries that have rendered modern criminal law practice a
highly specialized endeavor that requires mastery of complex bodies of law
such as federal and state sentencing guidelines; Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence; and massive criminal codes.73 Even if the

66. An Act for Regulateing of Tryals in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason, 1696,
7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3 (Eng.), in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 6 (John Raithby ed., 182o).
67.
Id.
See Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3 oo6(A) (2012) (setting requirements for
68.
adequate representation of defendants).
69.
See supra Part I.B.
There conceivably could be a narrow category of criminal cases for which a
7o .
bankruptcy attorney might be qualified. For instance, if the charges against the defendant
alleged bankruptcy fraud, a bankruptcy attorney might well be qualified to represent the
defendant. That category of cases, though, would not include most of the criminal docket.
SeeUnited States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 (1984).
71.
72.

Id. at 665-66.

73.

See Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Exploring the Risk of Disparity

from Differences in Defense Counsel Under Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. REV. 435, 444-46

(2002) (noting that both "the sheer amount of law" and the substance of the law "heighten the
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defendant can establish an inexperienced lawyer's deficient performance,
unless she has persuasive evidence of a defense that should have been
presented at trial or a sentencing claim that would have prevailed, moreover,
she cannot prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under
Strickland.74
A lawyer who has not previously represented a defendant in any
criminal case may be able to eke out a sufficient performance to meet the
minimum requirements imposed by Strickland.75 But if the Framers intended
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel mirror the right to counsel
provided by the Treason Act of 1696-namely, by ensuring representation
by a suitably qualified attorney-such representation would fall far short of
that guarantee, regardless of the purported accuracy of the result in any
particular defendant's case.
III.

AN ORIGINALIST SIXTH AMENDMENT STANDARD

If the right to "assistance of counsel" under the Sixth Amendment
means something more than the right to have a lawyer-in other words, if
the right encompasses the right to qualified counsel-then a court violates
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it appoints, to
represent him, a lawyer unversed in criminal law. In this way, the Sixth
Amendment, properly understood, shifts the responsibility for providing
competent representation back to the state rather than placing the burden
of proving ineffective assistance on the defendant.
Of course, the Court would have to determine the precise standard for
identifying a properly qualified lawyer. At the very least, however, the
outside limits of that standard could be readily ascertained: In felony cases,
lawyers with no experience in criminal cases could not provide the
"assistance of counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.76
Two objections to requiring qualified lawyers deserve response. First,
some may argue that this standard is impractical. After all, defense counsel

challenges for defense counsel and may exacerbate the impact of differences in the quality of
defense counsel").
74. See Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984). (holding that defendant must
establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's errors). The
challenges of establishing ineffective assistance are magnified if the trial lawyer represents the
defendant on direct appeal, as often happens. Under those circumstances, counsel likely will

not raise ineffectiveness, and the defendant then has to raise the issue on post-conviction
review, when he is not entitled to representation by counsel. As many have pointed out,
developing the record that counsel's errors were prejudicial without the assistance of counsel
can be prohibitively difficult. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, StructuralReform in CriminalDefense:
Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 68o-81 (2007).

75. See Strickland,466 U.S. at 669-70.
76. I recognize that experience is not necessarily an adequate substitute for skill. In other
words, there are many experienced but inept lawyers. The performance of those lawyers should
be examined to assure that defendants receive a fair trial under the Strickland standard.
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need to gain experience somewhere.77 How can defense lawyers gain that
experience? There are a number of ways that a lawyer could get the
necessary experience. For instance, law students who know they want to
practice criminal law could participate in a criminal justice clinic during
which they could either try a case under the supervision of a practicing
lawyer or assist in the trial of a case. Similarly, new public defenders could
second-chair cases being handled by a more senior attorney.78 Lawyers with
no criminal experience, however, could not meet the Sixth Amendment
standard for a routine felony case.79
Second, what should happen with criminal defendants who wish to hire
an inexperienced attorney? Defendants, of course, can waive virtually all of
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, including the right to counsel
itself.so Accordingly, so long as a defendant waives the Sixth Amendment
right to be represented by counsel, the defendant could hire an
inexperienced lawyer. In short, any practical objections to requiring
qualified counsel are surmountable.
CONCLUSION

Because the history of the Sixth Amendment provides persuasive
evidence that the Framers used the word "counsel" to encompass only
competent, qualified lawyers, the Court should adopt a new framework,
protecting the right to representation by a qualified or competent advocate
under the Sixth Amendment, and, assuming representation by
constitutionally adequate counsel, assessing the performance of that counsel
under the Due Process Clause.

See Cronic,466 U.S. at 665 ("Every experienced criminal defense attorney once tried
77.
his first criminal case.").
78.
Some courts require lawyers to have either conducted a trial or second-chaired a trial
D.D.C. Cr. R. 4 4 .1 (b), available at
before appearing as sole or lead counsel in a trial. See, e.g.,
http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/sites/www.dcd.uscourts.gov.dcd/fleS/201o..-MARCH-LOCAL
_RULESREVISEDJuly2o1_1July2os3.pdf. Many states also have a similar rule for attorneys
representing capital defendants.
79.
As discussed above, if the criminal charges relate to an area within the lawyer's expertise,
that lawyer might be qualified even if she had not previously represented a criminal defendant.
See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6, 835 (1975) (internal quotation marks
8o.
omitted) (holding that a defendant may "knowingly and intelligently" waive the right to counsel).
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